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Abstract. Emails today are often encrypted, but only be-
tween mail servers—the vast majority of emails are exposed
in plaintext to the mail servers that handle them. While better
than no encryption, this arrangement leaves open the pos-
sibility of attacks, privacy violations, and other disclosures.
Publicly, email providers have stated that default end-to-end
encryption would conflict with essential functions (spam fil-
tering, etc.), because the latter requires analyzing email text.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that there is no con-
flict. We do so by designing, implementing, and evaluating
Pretzel. Starting from a cryptographic protocol that enables
two parties to jointly perform a classification task without
revealing their inputs to each other, Pretzel refines and adapts
this protocol to the email context. Our experimental evalua-
tion of a prototype demonstrates that email can be encrypted
end-to-end and providers can compute over it, at tolerable
cost: clients must devote some storage and processing, and
provider overhead is roughly 5× versus the status quo.
1 Introduction
Email is ubiquitous and fundamental. For many, it is the
principal communication medium, even with intimates. For
these reasons, and others that we outline below, our animating
ideal in this paper is that email should be end-to-end private
by default.
How far are we from this ideal? On the plus side, hop-by-
hop encryption has brought encouraging progress in protect-
ing email privacy against a range of network-level attacks.
Specifically, many emails now travel between servers over
encrypted channels (TLS [41, 50]). And network connections
between the user and the provider are often encrypted, for
example using HTTPS (in the case of webmail providers) or
VPNs (in the case of enterprise email accounts).
However, emails are not by default encrypted end-to-end
between the two clients: intermediate hops, such as the
sender’s and receiver’s provider, handle emails in plaintext.
Since these providers are typically well-run services with a
reputation to protect, many users are willing to just trust them.
This trust however, appears to stem more from shifting so-
cial norms than from the fundamental technical safety of the
arrangement, which instead seems to call for greater caution.
Reputable organizations have been known to unwittingly
harbor rogue employees bent on gaining access to user email
accounts and other private user information [26, 99, 135].
If you were developing your latest startup idea over email,
would you be willing to bet its viability on the assumption that
every employee within the provider acts properly? And well-
run organizations are not immune from hacks [121, 122]—
nor, indeed, from the law. Just in the first half of 2013,
Google [59], Microsoft [94] and Yahoo! [126] collectively
received over 29,000 requests for email data from law enforce-
ment, and in the overwhelming majority of cases responded
with some customer data [93]. Many of these requests did not
even require a warrant: under current law [100], email older
than 180 days can be acquired without judicial approval.
End-to-end email encryption can shield email contents
from prying eyes and reduce privacy loss when webmail ac-
counts are hacked; and, while authorities would still be able
to acquire private email by serving subpoenas to the account’s
owner, they would not gain unfettered access to someone’s
private correspondence without that party’s knowledge.
Why then are emails not encrypted end-to-end by de-
fault? After all, there has long been software that imple-
ments this functionality, notably PGP [144]; moreover, the
large webmail providers offer it as an option [58, 125] (see
also [23, 107, 109, 120]). A crucial reason—at least the one
that is often cited [37, 38, 49, 60, 106]—is that encryption
appears to be incompatible with value-added functions (such
as spam filtering, email search, and predictive personal as-
sistance [27]) and with the functions by which “free” web-
mail providers monetize user data (for example, topic ex-
traction) [62]. These functions are proprietary; for example,
the provider might have invested in training a spam filtering
model, and does not want to publicize it (even if a dedicated
party can infer it [112]). So it follows that the functions must
execute on providers’ servers with access to plaintext emails.
But does that truly follow? Our objective in this paper is to
refute these claims of incompatibility, and thus move a step
closer to the animating ideal that we stated at the outset, by
building an alternative, called Pretzel.
In Pretzel, senders encrypt email using an end-to-end en-
cryption scheme, and the intended recipients decrypt and
obtain email contents. Then, the email provider and each re-
cipient engage in a secure two-party computation (2PC); the
term refers to cryptographic protocols that enable one or both
parties to learn the output of an agreed-upon function, without
revealing the inputs to each other. For example, a provider
supplies its spam filter, a user supplies an email, and both
parties learn whether the email is spam while protecting the
details of the filter and the content of the email.
The challenge in Pretzel comes from the 2PC component.
There is a tension between expressive power (the best 2PC
schemes can handle any function and even hide it from one
of the two parties) and cost (those schemes remain exorbitant,
despite progress in lowering the costs; §3.2). Therefore, in
designing Pretzel, we decided to make certain compromises
to gain even the possibility of plausible performance: baking
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in specific algorithms, requiring that the algorithms not be
proprietary (only their inputs, such as model parameters, are
hidden), and incurring per-function design work.
The paper’s central example is classification, which Pretzel
applies to both spam filtering and topic extraction (for com-
pleteness, the implementation also includes a simple keyword
search function). Pretzel’s first step is to compose (a) a rela-
tively efficient 2PC protocol (§3.2) geared to computations
that consist mostly of linear operations[19, 28, 69, 98, 102],
(b) linear classifiers from machine learning (Naive Bayes,
SVMs, logistic regression), which fit this form and which have
good accuracy (§3.1), and (c) mechanisms that protect against
adversarial parties. Although the precise protocol (§3.3) has
not appeared before, we don’t claim it as a contribution, as
its elements are well-understood. This combination is simply
the jumping-off point for Pretzel.
The work of Pretzel is adapting and incorporating this base-
line into a system for end-to-end encrypted email. In this con-
text, the costs of the baseline would be, if not quite outlandish,
nevertheless too high. Pretzel responds, first, with lower-level
protocol refinements: revisiting the cryptosystem (§4.1) and
designing a packing technique that conserves calls into the
cryptosystem (§4.2). Second, for topic extraction, Pretzel re-
arranges the setup, by decomposing classification into a non-
private step, performed by the client, which prunes the set of
topics; and a private step that further refines this candidate
set to a single topic. Making this work requires a modified
protocol that, roughly speaking, selects a candidate maximum
from a particular subset, while hiding that subset (§4.3). Third,
Pretzel applies well-known ideas (feature selection to reduce
costs, various mechanisms to guard against misuses of the
protocol, etc.); here, the work is demonstrating that these are
suitable in the present context.
We freely admit that not all elements of Pretzel are individ-
ually remarkable. However, taken together, they produce the
first (to our knowledge) demonstration that classification can
be done privately, at tolerable cost, in the email setting.
Indeed, evaluation (§6) of our implementation (§5) indi-
cates that Pretzel’s cost, versus a legacy non-private imple-
mentation, is estimated to be up to 5.4×, with additional
client-side requirements of several hundred megabytes of
storage and per-email CPU cost of several hundred millisec-
onds. These costs represent reductions versus the starting
point (§3.3) of up to 100×.
Our work here has clear limitations (§7). Reflecting its pro-
totype status, our implementation does not hide metadata, and
handles only the three functions mentioned (ideally, it would
handle predictive personal assistance, virus scanning, and
more). More fundamentally, Pretzel compromises on func-
tionality; by its design, both user and provider have to agree
on the algorithm, with only the inputs being private. Most
fundamentally, Pretzel cannot achieve the ideal of perfect
privacy; it seems inherent in the problem setup that one party
gains information that would ideally be hidden. On the other
hand, these leaks are generally bounded, and concerned users
can opt out, possibly at some dollar cost (§4.4, §7).
The biggest limitation, though, is that Pretzel cannot
change the world on its own. As we discuss later (§7), there
are other obstacles en route to the ultimate goal: general de-
ployment difficulties, key management, usability, and even
politics. However, we hope that the exercise of working
through the technical details to produce an existence proof
(and a rough cost estimate) will at least shape discourse about
the viability of default end-to-end email encryption.
2 Architecture and overview of Pretzel
2.1 Design ethos: (non)requirements
Pretzel would ideally (a) enable rich computation over email,
(b) hide the inputs and implementations of those computa-
tions, and (c) impose negligible overhead. But these three
ideals are in tension. Below we describe the compromises
that form Pretzel’s design ethos.
• Functionality. We will not insist that Pretzel provide exact
replicas of the rich computations that today’s providers run
over emails; instead, the goal is to retain approximations
of these functions.
• Provider privacy. Related to the prior point, Pretzel will not
support proprietary algorithms; instead, Pretzel will protect
the inputs to the algorithms. For example, all users of Pret-
zel will know the spam filtering model, but the parameters
to the model will be proprietary.
• User privacy. Pretzel will not try to enshroud users’ email
in complete secrecy; indeed, it seems unavoidable that
computing over emails would reveal some information
about them. However, Pretzel will be designed to reveal
only the outputs of the computation, and these outputs will
be short (in bits).
• Threat model and maliciousness. Pretzel will not build in
protection against actions that subvert the protocol’s se-
mantics (for example, a provider who follows the protocol
to the letter but who designs the topic extraction model to
try to recover a precise email); we will deal with this issue
by relying on context, a point we elaborate on later (§4.4,
§7). Pretzel will, however, build in defenses against adver-
saries that deviate from the protocol’s mechanics; these
defenses will not assume particular misbehaviors, only that
adversaries are subject to normal cryptographic hardness.
• Performance and price. Whereas the status quo imposes
little overhead on email clients, Pretzel will require storage
and computation at clients. However, Pretzel will aim to
limit the storage cost to several hundred megabytes and
the CPU cost to a few hundred milliseconds of time per
processed email. For the provider, Pretzel’s aim is to limit
overhead to small multiples of the cost in the status quo.
• Deployability and usability. Certain computations, such as
encryption, will have to run on the client; however, Pretzel
will aim to be configuration-free. Also, Pretzel must be
backwards compatible with existing email delivery infras-
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Figure 1—Pretzel’s architecture. e denotes plaintext email; e′ de-
notes encrypted email. The sender’s provider is not depicted.
tructure (SMTP, IMAP, etc.).
2.2 Architecture
Figure 1 shows Pretzel’s architecture. Pretzel comprises an
e2e module and function modules. The e2e module imple-
ments an end-to-end encryption scheme; a function module
implements a semantic computation (spam filtering, etc.). The
e2e module is client-side only, while a function module has a
component at the client and another at the provider.
At a high level, Pretzel works as follows. An email sender
uses its e2e module to encrypt and sign an email for an email
recipient (step À). The recipient uses its e2e module to au-
thenticate and decrypt the email (step Á). The e2e module
can implement any end-to-end encryption scheme; Pretzel’s
current prototype uses GPG [1]. Next, the recipient passes
the decrypted email contents to the client-side components
of the function modules (step Â). Finally, these client-side
components participate in a protocol with their counterparts
at the provider (step Ã). At the end of the protocol, either the
client or the provider learns the output of the computation.
Pretzel’s e2e module requires cryptographic keys for en-
crypting, decrypting, signing, and verifying. Thus, Pretzel
requires a solution to key management [2, 90, 120]. However,
this is a separate effort, deserving of its own paper or product
and (as noted in the introduction) is one of the obstacles that
Pretzel does not address. Later (§7), we discuss why we are
optimistic that it will ultimately be overcome.
The main work for Pretzel surrounds the function mod-
ules; the challenge is to balance privacy, functionality, and
performance (§2.1). Our focus will be on two modules: spam
filtering and topic extraction (§3, §4). We will also report on a
keyword search module (§5). But before delving into details,
we walk through some necessary background, on the class
of computations run by these modules and the cryptographic
protocols that they build on.
3 Background, baseline, and related work
3.1 Classification
Spam filtering and topic extraction are classification problems
and, as such, require classifier algorithms. Pretzel is geared to
linear classifiers. So far, we have implemented Naive Bayes
(NB) [63, 89, 92, 101] classifiers, specifically a variant of
Graham-Robinson’s NB [63, 101] for spam filtering (we call
this variant GR-NB),1 and multinomial NB [89] for topic ex-
traction; Logistic Regression (LR) classifiers [51, 57, 82, 95],
specifically binary LR [82] and multinomial LR [51] for spam
filtering and topic extraction respectively; and linear Support
Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers [29, 40, 73, 104], specif-
ically two-class and one-versus-all SVM [29] for spam fil-
tering and topic extraction respectively. These algorithms, or
variants of them, yield high accuracy [39, 57, 63, 65, 73, 139]
(see also §6.1, §6.2), and are used both commercially [18] and
in popular open-source software packages for spam filtering,
classification, and general machine learning [3–7, 51].
The three types of classifiers differ in their underlying
assumptions and how they learn parameters from training data.
However, when applying a trained model, they all perform
analogous linear operations. We will use Naive Bayes as a
running example, because it is the simplest to explain.
Naive Bayes classifiers. These algorithms assume that a doc-
ument can belong to one of several categories (for example,
spam or non-spam). The algorithms output a prediction of a
document’s category.
Documents (emails) are represented by feature vectors
~x=(x1, . . . , xN), where N is the total number of features. A
feature can be a word, a group of words, or any other effi-
ciently computable aspect of the document; the algorithms
do not assume a particular mapping between documents and
feature vectors, only that some mapping exists. In the GR-
NB spam classifier [63, 101], xi is Boolean, and indicates
the presence or absence of feature i in the document; in the
multinomial NB text classifier, xi is the frequency of feature i.
The algorithms take as input a feature vector and a model
that describes the categories. A model is a set of vectors
{(~vj, p(Cj))} (1 ≤ j ≤ B), where Cj is a category (for exam-
ple, spam or non-spam), and B is the number of categories
(two for spam; 2208 for topics, based on Google’s public
list of topics [8]). p(Cj) denotes the assumed a priori cate-
gory distribution. The ith entry of~vj is denoted p(ti |Cj) and
is, roughly speaking, the probability that feature i, call it ti,
appears in documents whose category is Cj.2
The GR-NB spam classification algorithm labels an email,
as represented by feature vector ~x, as spam if p(spam |~x)
is greater than some fixed threshold. To do so, the algo-
rithm computes α = 1/p(spam |~x)− 1 in log space. One can
1The original Graham-Robinson NB protects against spam emails that hide a
short message within a large non-spam text [64]. We do not implement that
piece; the resulting change in classification accuracy is small (§6.1).
2In more detail, the GR-NB spam classifier assumes that the {xi} are realiza-
tions of independent, separate Bernoulli random variables (RVs), with the
probabilities of each RV, p(ti |Cj), depending on the hypothesized category.
The multinomial NB text classifier assumes that the {xi} follow a multino-
mial distribution, with N bins and
∑
i xi trials, where the bin probabilities
are p(ti |Cj) and depend on the hypothesized category.
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show (Apdx A.1) that logα is equivalent to:(
i=N∑
i=1
xi · log p(ti |C2)
)
+ 1 · log p(C2)
−
(
i=N∑
i=1
xi · log p(ti |C1)
)
+ 1 · log p(C1), (1)
where C1 represents spam and C2 represents non-spam.
For the multinomial NB text classifier, selection works
by identifying the category Cj∗ that maximizes likelihood:
j∗ = argmaxj p(Cj |~x). One can show (Apdx A.2) that it
suffices to select the Cj for which the following is maximal:(
i=N∑
i=1
xi · log p(ti |Cj)
)
+ 1 · log p(Cj). (2)
For LR and SVM classifiers, the term log p(ti |Cj) is re-
placed by a “weight” term wi,j for feature xi and category Cj,
and log p(Cj) is replaced by a “bias” term bj for category j.
3.2 Secure two-party computation
To perform the computation described above within a function
module (§2.2) securely, i.e., in a way that the client does not
learn the model parameters and the provider does not learn
the feature vector, Pretzel uses secure two-party computation
(2PC): cryptographic protocols that enable two parties to
compute a function without revealing their inputs to each
other [56, 128]. Pretzel builds on a relatively efficient 2PC
protocol [19, 28, 69, 98, 102] that we name Yao+GLLM; we
present this below, informally and bottom up. (For details and
rigorous descriptions, see [55, 66, 84, 103].)
Yao’s 2PC. A building block of Yao+GLLM is the classic
scheme of Yao [128]. Let f be a function, represented as a
Boolean circuit (meaning a network of Boolean gates: AND,
OR, etc.), with n-bit input, and let there be two parties P1
and P2 that supply separate pieces of this input, denoted x1
and x2, respectively. Then Yao (as the protocol is sometimes
known), when run between P1 and P2, takes as inputs f and
x1 from P1, x2 from P2, and outputs f (x1, x2) to P2, such that
neither party learns about the other’s input: P1 does not learn
anything about x2, and P2 does not learn anything about x1
except what can be inferred from f (x1, x2).
At a very high level, Yao works by having one party gen-
erate encrypted truth tables, called garbled Boolean gates,
for gates in the original circuit, and having the other party
decrypt and thereby evaluate the garbled gates.
In principle, Yao handles arbitrary functions. In practice,
however, the costs are high. A big problem is the computa-
tional model. For example, 32-bit multiplication, when rep-
resented as a Boolean circuit, requires on the order of 2,000
gates, and each of those gates induces cryptographic oper-
ations (encryption, etc.). Recent activity has improved the
costs (see [61, 67, 77, 79, 83, 108, 133, 134] and references
therein), but the bottom line is still too expensive to han-
dle arbitrary computations. Indeed, Pretzel’s prototype uses
Yao very selectively—just to compute several comparisons
of 32-bit numbers—and even then it turns out to be a bot-
tleneck (§6.1, §6.2), despite using a recent and optimized
implementation [132, 133].
Secure dot products. Another building block of Yao+GLLM
is a secure dot product protocol, specifically GLLM [55].
Many such protocols (also called secure scalar product
(SSP) protocols) have been proposed [21, 25, 43–48, 55,
70, 105, 113, 114, 123, 124, 141–143]. They fall into two
categories: those that are provably secure [43, 55, 123] and
those that either have no security proof or require trusting
a third party [21, 25, 44–48, 70, 105, 113, 114, 124, 141–
143]. Several protocols in the latter category have been at-
tacked [36, 55, 68, 75, 80]. GLLM [55] is in the first category,
is state of the art, and is widely used.
Hybrid: Yao+GLLM. Pretzel’s starting point is Yao+GLLM,
a hybrid of Yao and GLLM. It is depicted in Figure 2. One
party starts with a matrix, and encrypts the entries. The other
party starts with a vector and leverages additive (not fully)
homomorphic encryption (AHE) to (a) compute the vector-
matrix product in cipherspace, and (b) blind the resulting
vector. The first party then decrypts to obtain the blinded
vector. The vector then feeds into Yao: the two parties remove
the blinding and perform some computation φ.
Yao+GLLM has been applied to spam filtering using
LR [98], face recognition using SVM [19], and face and bio-
metric identification using Euclidean distance [28, 69, 102].
Other related work. There are many works on private clas-
sification that do not build on Yao+GLLM. They rely on alter-
nate building blocks or hybrids: additively homomorphic en-
cryption [30, 85] (AHE), fully homomorphic encryption [78]
(FHE), or a different Yao hybrid [33]. For us, Yao+GLLM
appeared to be a more promising starting point (as examples,
Yao+GLLM contains a packing optimization that significantly
saves client-side storage resources relative to [30], and in
contrast to [78], Yao+GLLM reveals only the final output of
the computation rather than intermediate dot products).
Another related line of research focuses on privacy and
linear classifiers—but in the training phase. Multiple parties
can train a global model without revealing their private in-
puts [53, 54, 76, 110, 115, 116, 118, 127, 129–131, 136–138],
or a party can release a trained “noisy” model that hides its
training data [74, 117, 140]. These works are complementary
to Pretzel’s focus on applying the model.
3.3 Baseline protocol
Pretzel begins by applying the Yao+GLLM protocol (Figure 2,
§3.2) to the algorithms described in Section 3.1. This works
because expressions (1) and (2) are dot products of the neces-
sary form. Specifically, the provider is party A and supplies
(~vj, p(Cj)), the client is party B and supplies (~x, 1), and the
protocol computes their dot product. Then, the threshold com-
parison (for spam filtering) or the maximal selection (for topic
extraction) happens inside an instance of Yao. For spam fil-
4
Yao+GLLM
• The protocol has two parties. Party A begins with a matrix; Party B begins with a vector. The protocol computes a vector-matrix product and
then performs an arbitrary computation, φ, on the resulting vector; neither party’s input is revealed to the other.
• The protocol assumes an additively homomorphic encryption (AHE) scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec), meaning that Enc(pk, m1) ·
Enc(pk, m2)=Enc(pk, m1 + m2), where m1, m2 are plaintext messages, + represents addition of two plaintext messages, and · is an op-
eration on the ciphertexts. This also implies that given a constant z and Enc(pk, m1), one can compute Enc(pk, z · m1).
Setup phase
1. Party A forms a matrix with columns~v1, . . . ,~vB; each vector has N components. It does the following:
• Generates public and secret keys (pk, sk)← Gen(1k), where k is a security parameter.
• Encrypts each column component-wise, so Enc(pk,~vj) = (Enc(pk, v1,j), . . . ,Enc(pk, vN,j)).
• Sends the encrypted matrix columns and pk to Party B.
Computation phase
2. Party B begins with an N-component vector~x=(x1, . . . , xN). It does the following:
• (dot products) Computes encrypted dot product for each matrix column: Enc(pk, dj)=Enc(pk,
∑N
i=1 xi · vi,j), this abuses notation, since
the encryption function is not deterministic. The computation relies on the homomorphic property.
• (blinding) Blinds dj by adding random noise nj ∈R {0, 1}b+δ . That is, computes Enc(pk, dj + nj)=Enc(pk, dj) ·Enc(pk, nj). Here b is the
bit-length of dj and δ ≥ 1 is a security parameter.
• Sends (Enc(pk, d1 + n1), . . . ,Enc(pk, dB + nB)) to Party A.
3. Party A applies Dec component-wise, to get (d1 + n1, . . . , dB + nB)
4. Party A and Party B participate in Yao’s 2PC protocol; they use a function f that subtracts the noise nj from dj + nj and applies the function
φ to the dj. One of the two parties (which one depends on the arrangement) obtains the output φ(d1, . . . , dB).
Figure 2—Yao+GLLM. This protocol [19, 28, 69, 98, 102] combines GLLM’s secure dot products [55] with Yao’s general-purpose 2PC [128].
Pretzel’s design and implementation apply this protocol to the linear classifiers described in §3.1. The provider is Party A, and the client is
Party B. Pretzel’s instantiation of this protocol incorporates several additional elements (§3.3): a variant of Yao [71, 77] that defends against
actively adversarial parties; amortization of the expense of this variant via precomputation in the setup phase; a technique to defend against
adversarial key generation (for example, not invoking Gen); and a packing technique (§4.2) in step 1 (bullet 2) and step 2 (bullet 1).
tering, the client receives the classification output; for topic
extraction, the provider does. Note that storing the encrypted
model at the client is justified by an assumption that model
vectors change infrequently.
In defining this baseline, we include mechanisms to defend
against adversarial parties (§2.2). Specifically, whereas under
the classical Yao protocol an actively adversarial party can
obtain the other’s private inputs [71], Pretzel incorporates a
variant [71, 77] that solves this problem. This variant brings
some additional expense, but it can be incurred during the
setup phase and amortized. Also, Yao+GLLM assumes that the
AHE’s key generation is done honestly, whereas we would
prefer not to make that assumption; Pretzel incorporates the
standard response.3
While the overall baseline is literally new (Yao+GLLM was
previously used in weaker threat models, etc.), its elements
are well-known, so we do not claim novelty.
4 Pretzel’s protocol refinements
The baseline just described is a promising foundation. But
adapting it to an end-to-end system for encrypted email re-
quires work. The main issue is costs. As examples, for a
spam classification model with N=5M features, the protocol
3In more detail, the AHE has public parameters which, if chosen adversely
(non-randomly) would undermine the expected usage. To get around this,
Pretzel determines these parameters with Diffie-Hellman key exchange [42,
91], so that both parties inject randomness into these parameters.
consumes over 1 GB of client-side storage space; for topic
extraction with B=2048 categories, it consumes over 150 ms
of provider-side CPU time and 8 MB in network transfers (§6).
Another thing to consider is the robustness of the guarantees.
This section describes Pretzel’s refinements, adjustments,
and modifications. The nature of the work varies from low-
level cryptographic optimizations, to architectural rearrange-
ment, to applications of known ideas (in which case the work
is demonstrating that they are suitable here). We begin with
refinements that are aimed at reducing costs (§4.1–§4.3), the
effects of which are summarized in Figure 3; then we describe
Pretzel’s robustness to misbehaving parties (§4.4).
4.1 Replacing the cryptosystem
Both Pretzel’s protocol and the baseline require additively
homomorphic encryption (Figure 2). The traditional choice
for AHE—it is used in prior works [19, 69, 98, 102]—is Pail-
lier [96], which is based on a longstanding number-theoretic
presumed hardness assumption. However, Paillier’s Dec takes
hundreds of microseconds on a modern CPU, which con-
tributes substantially to provider-side CPU time.
Instead, Pretzel turns to a cryptosystem based on the Ring-
LWE assumption [87], a relatively young assumption (which
is usually a disadvantage in cryptography) but one that has
nonetheless received a lot of recent attention [17, 31, 86, 88].
Specifically, Pretzel incorporates the additively homomorphic
cryptosystem of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [32], as im-
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Non-private Baseline (§3.3) Pretzel (§4.1–§4.3)
Setup
Provider CPU time N/A N ·βpail ·epail+Kcpu N′ ·β′xpir ·expir+Kcpu
Client CPU time N/A Kcpu Kcpu
Network transfers N/A N ·βpail ·cpail+Knet N′ ·β′xpir ·cxpir+Knet
Client storage N/A N ·βpail ·cpail N′ ·β′xpir ·cxpir
Per-email
Provider CPU L ·h+L ·B ·s βpail ·dpail+B ·yper-in β′′xpir ·dxpir+B′′ ·yper-in
Client CPU N/A L ·βpail ·apail+βpail ·epail+B·yper-in L ·βxpir ·axpir+(L+B′) ·s+β′′xpir ·expir+B′′ ·yper-in
Network szemail szemail + βpail ·cpail+B·szper-in szemail + β′′xpir ·cxpir+B′′ ·szper-in
L = number of features (§3.3) in an email h = CPU time to extract a feature and lookup its conditional probabilities
B = number of categories in the model (§3.3) s = CPU time to add two probabilities
szemail = size of an email N′ = number of features selected after aggressive feature selection (§4.3)
N = number of features in the model (§3.3) e = encryption (in an AHE scheme) CPU time
d = decryption (in an AHE scheme) CPU time c = ciphertext size in an AHE scheme
a = homomorphic addition (in an AHE scheme) CPU time (Fig. 2) b = log L+bin+ fin (§4.2)
bin = # of bits to encode a model parameter (§4.2) fin = # of bits for the frequency of a feature in an email (§4.2)
p = # of b-bit probabilities packed in a ciphertext (§4.2) s = “left-shift” CPU time in XPIR-BV (§4.2)
B′′ = B (if spam) or B′= # of candidate topics (B) (§4.3) (if topics) βpail :=dB/ppaile,βxpir :=dB/pxpire
β′xpir :=bB/pxpirc+1/bpxpir/kc where k=(B mod pxpir) β′′xpir :=βxpir (if spam) or B′ (if topics)
yper-in, szper-in = Yao CPU time and network transfers per b-bit input (§3.2) Kcpu, Knet = constants for CPU and network costs (§3.3)
Figure 3—Cost estimates for classification. Non-private refers to a system in which a provider locally classifies plaintext email. The baseline is
described in Section 3.3. Microbenchmarks are given in §6.
plemented and optimized by Melchor et al. [20] in the XPIR
system; we call this XPIR-BV. This change brings the cost
of each invocation of Dec down over an order of magnitude,
to scores of microseconds (§6), and similarly with Enc. The
gain is reflected in the cost model (Figure 3), in replacing dpail
with dxpir (likewise with epail and expir, etc.)
However, the change makes ciphertexts 64× larger: from
256 bytes to 16 KB. Yet, this is not the disaster that it seems.
Network costs do increase (in Figure 2, step 2, bullet 3), but
by far less than 64×. Because the domain of the encryption
function grows, one can tame what would otherwise be an
explosion in network and storage, and also gain further CPU
savings. We describe this next.
4.2 Packing
The basic idea is to represent multiple plaintext elements in a
single ciphertext; this opportunity exists because the domain
of Enc is much larger than any single element that needs to
be encrypted. Using packing, one can reduce the number of
invocations of Enc and Dec in Figure 2, specifically in step 1
bullet 2, step 2 bullet 2, and step 3. The consequence is a
significant reduction in resource consumption, specifically
provider CPU time and storage for spam filtering, and provider
CPU time for topic extraction.
The challenge is to preserve the semantic content of the
underlying operation (dot product) within cipherspace. Below,
we describe prior work, and then how Pretzel overcomes a
limitation in this work.
Prior work. A common packing technique is as follows.
Let G denote number of bits in the domain of the encryp-
tion algorithm Enc, bin denote the number of semantically
useful bits in an element that would be encrypted (a model
parameter in our case), and fin denote the number of bits for
the multiplier of an encrypted element (frequency of a fea-
ture extracted from an email in our case). The output of a
p
v1 v2 v(p-1) vp
p < p
v(B-1) vB
Figure 4—Packing in Pretzel.
dot product computation—assuming a sum of L products,
each formed from a bin-bit element and a fin-bit element—
has b = log L + bin + fin “semantic bits,” (in our context, L
would be the number of features extracted from an email).
This means that there is “room” to pack p = dG/be bits into
a single ciphertext.
GLLM [55] incorporates this technique; this takes place
in Figure 2, step 1, bullet 2 (though it isn’t depicted in the
figure). In that step, GLLM traverses each row in its matrix
from left to right, encrypting together sets of p numbers. If
fewer than p numbers are left, the scheme encrypts those
together but does not cross a row. Then, in step 2, bullet 1
it performs dot products on the packed ciphertexts, by ex-
ploiting the fact that the elements that need to be added
are aligned. For example, if the elements in the first row
(v1,1, . . . , v1,p) are to be added to those in the second row
(v2,1, . . . , v2,p), then the ciphertext space operation applied
to c1=Enc(pk, v1,1‖ . . . ‖v1,p) and c2=Enc(pk, v2,1‖ . . . ‖v2,p)
yields c3 = c1 · c2 = Enc(pk, v1,1 + v2,1‖ . . . ‖v1,p + v2,p).
For this to work, the individual sums (e.g., v1,p + v2,p) cannot
overflow b bits.
Pretzel’s packing scheme. With the technique above, the
“last ciphertext” in a row contains extra space whenever B
is larger than a multiple of p; this is because ciphertexts
from different rows are not packed together. If dB/pe is large,
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then this waste is insignificant. However, if B is small—and
in particular is much smaller than p—then the preceding
technique leaves a substantial optimization opportunity on
the table. For example, if B = 2 (as in the spam filtering
application) and p = 1024 (as in the XPIR-BV cryptosystem)
then the technique described above packs two elements per
ciphertext, gaining a factor of two, when a factor of 1024 was
possible in principle.
Pretzel’s packing technique “crosses rows.” Specifically,
Pretzel splits the matrix {(~vj, p(Cj))} into zero or more sets of
p column vectors plus up to one set with fewer than p vectors
as depicted in Figure 4. For the sets with p vectors, Pretzel
follows the technique above. For the last set, Pretzel packs
elements in row-major order without restricting the packing
to be within a row (see the rightmost matrix in Figure 4),
under one constraint: elements in the same row of the matrix
must not be put into different ciphertexts.
The challenge with across-row packing is being able to
add elements from two different rows that are packed in the
same ciphertext (in step 2, bullet 1). To address this chal-
lenge, Pretzel exploits the homomorphism to cyclically rotate
the packed elements in a ciphertext. For example, assume
c=Enc(pk, v1,1‖ . . . ‖v1,k‖v2,1‖ . . . ‖v2,k) is a packed cipher-
text, where v1,1, . . . , v1,k are elements from the first row, and
v2,1, . . . , v2,k are from the second row. To add each v1,i with
v2,i for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, one can “left-shift” elements in c by k
positions to get c′=Enc(pk, v2,1‖ . . . ‖v2,k‖ . . .); this is done
by applying the “constant multiplication” operation (Figure 2,
bullet 2), with z = 2k·b. At this point, the rows are “lined up”,
and one can operate on c and c′ to add the plaintext elements.
Cost savings. Here we give rough estimates of the effect of
the refinements in this subsection and the previous; a more
detailed evaluation is in Section 6. For the spam filtering
module, the provider’s CPU drops by 5× and the client-side
storage drops by 7×, relative to the baseline (§3.3). However,
CPU at the client increases by 10× (owing to the cyclic shifts),
and the network overhead increases by 5.4×; despite these
increases, both costs are not exorbitant in absolute terms, and
we view them as tolerable (§6.1, §6.3). The provider-side
costs for spam filtering are comparable to an arrangement
where the provider classifies plaintext emails non-privately.
For the topic extraction module, the cost improvements
relative to the baseline (§3.3) are smaller: provider CPU drops
by 1.37×, client CPU drops by 3.25×, storage goes up by a
factor of 2, and the network cost goes up slightly. Beyond
that, the non-private version of this function is vastly cheaper
than for spam, to the point that the private version is up to
two orders of magnitude worse than a non-private version
(depending on the resource). The next section addresses this.
4.3 Rearranging and pruning in topic extraction
Decomposed classification. So far, many of the costs are
proportional to B: storage (see Figure 2, “setup phase”), CPU
cost of Yao, and network cost of Yao (step 4). For spam
filtering, this is not a problem (B = 2) but for topic extraction,
B can be in the thousands.
Pretzel’s response is a technique that we called decom-
posed classification. To explain the idea, we regard topic
extraction as abstractly mapping an email, together with a set
S of cardinality B (all possible topics), down to a set S∗ of
cardinality 1 (the chosen topic), using a proprietary model.
Pretzel decomposes this map into two:
(i) Map the email, together with the set S, to a set S′ of
cardinality B′ (for example, B′ = 20); S′ comprises
candidate topics. The client does this by itself.
(ii) Map the email, together with S′, down to a set S′′ of
cardinality 1; ideally S′′ is the same as S∗ (otherwise,
accuracy is sacrificed). This step relies on a proprietary
model and is done using secure two-party machinery.
Thus, the expensive part of the protocol is now propor-
tional to B′ rather than B.
For this arrangement to make sense, several requirements
must be met. First, the client needs to be able to perform the
map in step (i) locally. Here, Pretzel exploits an observation:
topic lists (the set S) are public today [8]. They have to be, so
that advertisers can target and users can set interests. Thus, a
client can in principle use some non-proprietary classifier for
step (i). Pretzel is agnostic about the source of this classifier;
it could be supplied by the client, the provider, or a third party.
Second, the arrangement needs to be accurate, which it is
when S′ contains S∗. Pretzel observes that although the classi-
fier used in step (i) would not be honed, it doesn’t need to be,
because it is performing a far coarser task than choosing a
single topic. Thus, in principle, the step (i) map might reliably
produce accurate outputs—meaning that the true topic, S∗,
is among the B′ candidates—without much training, exper-
tise, or other proprietary input. Our experiments confirm that
indeed the loss of end-to-end accuracy is small (§6.2).
Finally, step (ii) must not reveal S′ to the provider, since that
would be more information than a single extracted topic. This
rules out instantiating step (ii) by naively applying the existing
protocol (§3.3–§4.2), with S′ in place of S. Pretzel’s response
is depicted in Figure 5. There are some low-level details to
handle because of the interaction with packing (§4.2), but
at a high level, this protocol works as follows. The provider
supplies the entire proprietary model (with all B topics); the
client obtains B dot products, in encrypted form, via the inex-
pensive component of Yao+GLLM (secure dot product). The
client then extracts and blinds the B′ dot products that corre-
spond to the candidate topics. The parties finish by using Yao
to privately identify the topic that produced the maximum.
Feature selection. Protocol storage is proportional to N (Fig-
ure 2, “setup phase”). Pretzel’s response is the standard tech-
nique of feature selection [111]: incorporating into the model
the features most helpful for discrimination. This takes place
in the “setup phase” of the protocol (the number of rows in the
provider’s matrix reduces from N to N′). Of course, one pre-
sumes that providers already prune their models; the proposal
here is to do so more aggressively. Section 6.2 shows that in
return for large drops in the number of considered features,
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Pretzel’s protocol for proprietary topic extraction, based on candidate topics
• The protocol has two parties. Party A begins with a matrix ~v1, . . . ,~vB. Party B begins with a vector ~x=(x1, . . . , xN) and a list S′ of B′ < B
column indexes, where each index is between 1 and B; S′ indicates a subset of the columns of matrix~v. The protocol constructs a vector from
the product of ~x and the submatrix of ~v given by S′, and outputs the column index (in ~v) that corresponds to the maximum element in the
vector-submatrix product; neither party’s input is revealed to the other.
• The protocol has two phases: setup and computation. The setup phase is as described in Figure 2 but with the addition of packing from §4.2.
Computation phase
3. Party B does the following:
• (compute dot products) As described in Figure 2, step 2, bullet 1, and §4.2. At the end of the dot product computations, it gets a vector of
packed ciphertexts ~pcts=(Enc(pk, d1‖ . . . ‖dp), . . . ,Enc(pk, . . . ‖dB‖ . . .)), where di is the dot product of~x and the i-th matrix column~vi,
and p is the number of b-bit positions in a packed ciphertext (§4.2).
• (separate out dot products for the columns in S′ from the rest) For each entry in S′, i.e., S′[j], makes a copy of the packed ciphertext
containing dS′[j], and shifts dS′[j] to the left-most b-bit position in that ciphertext. Because each ciphertext holds p elements, the separation
works by using the quotient and remainder of S′[j], when divided by p, to identify, respectively, the relevant packed ciphertext and
position within it. That is, for 1 ≤ j ≤ B′, computes ciphertext Enc(pk, dS′[j]‖ . . .)= ~pcts[Qj] · 2b·Rj , where Qj=dS′[j]/pe − 1, and
Rj=(S′[j]− 1) mod p. The shifting relies on the multiply-by-constant homomorphic operation (see Figure 2 and §4.2).
• (blinding) Blinds dS′[j] using the technique described in Figure 2, step 2, bullet 2, but extended to packed ciphertexts. Sends the B′
ciphertexts (Enc(pk, dS′[1] + n1‖ . . .), . . . ,Enc(pk, dS′[B′] + nB′‖ . . .)) to Party A. Here, nj is the added noise.
4. Party A applies Dec on the B′ ciphertexts, followed by bitwise right shift on the resulting plaintexts, to get dS′[1] + n1, . . . , dS′[B′] + nB′ .
5. The two parties engage in Yao’s 2PC. Party B’s private inputs are S′ and {nj} for 1 ≤ j ≤ B′; Party A’s private inputs are {(dS′[j] + nj)}
for 1 ≤ j ≤ B′; and, the parties use a function f that subtracts nj from dS′[j] + nj, and computes and returns S′[argmaxj dS′[j]] to Party A.
Figure 5—Protocol for proprietary topic extraction, based on candidate topics (this instantiates step (ii) in Section 4.3). The provider is Party A;
the client is Party B. This protocol builds on the protocol presented in §3.3–§4.2.
the accuracy drops only modestly. In fact, reductions of 75%
in the number of features is a plausible operating point.
Cost savings. The client-side storage costs reduce by the
factor N/N′ due to feature selection. For B=2048, B′=20,
and L=692 (average number of features per email in the
authors’ emails), relative to the protocol in §4.2, the provider
CPU drops by 45×, client CPU drops by 8.4×, and the network
transfers drop by 20.4× (§6.2). Thus, the aforementioned two
orders of magnitude (above the non-private version) becomes
roughly 5×.
4.4 Robustness to misbehaving parties
Pretzel aims to provide the following guarantees, even when
parties deviate from the protocol:
1. The client and provider cannot (directly) observe each
other’s inputs nor any intermediate state in the computation.
2. The client learns at most 1 bit of output each time spam
classification is invoked.
3. The provider learns at most log B bits of output per email.
This comes from topic extraction.
Guarantee 1 follows from the baseline protocol, which
includes mechanisms that thwart the attempted subversion of
the protocol (§3.3). Guarantee 2 follows from Guarantee 1
and the fact that the client is the party who gets the spam
classification output. Guarantee 3 follows similarly, provided
that the client feeds each email into the protocol at most once;
we discuss this requirement shortly.
Before continuing, we note that the two applications are
not symmetric. In spam classification, the client, who gets the
output, could conceivably try to learn the provider’s model;
however, the provider does not directly learn anything about
the client’s email. With topic extraction, the roles are reversed.
Because the output is obtained by the provider, what is po-
tentially at risk is the privacy of the email of the client, who
instead has no access to the provider’s model.
Semantic leakage. Despite its guarantees about the number
of output bits, Pretzel has nothing to say about the meaning
of those bits. For example, in topic extraction, an adversar-
ial provider could construct a tailored “model” to attack an
email (or the emails of a particular user), in which case the
log B bits could yield important semantic information about
the email. A client who is concerned about this issue has
several options, including opting out of topic extraction (and
presumably compensating the provider for service, since a
key purpose of topic extraction is ad display, which generates
revenue). We describe a more mischievous response below.
In the spam application, an adversarial client could con-
struct emails to try to pinpoint or infer model parameters,
and then leak the model to spammers (and more generally
undermine the proprietary nature of the model). A possible
defense would be for the provider to periodically revise the
model (and maintain different versions).
Repetition and replay. An adversarial provider could con-
ceivably replay a given email to a client k times. The provider
would then get k log B bits from the email, rather than log B.
Our defense is simply for the client to regard email trans-
mission from each sender (and possibly each sender’s de-
vice) as a separate asynchronous—and lossy and duplicating—
transmission channel. Solutions to detecting duplicates over
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such channels are well-understood: counters, windows, etc.
Something to note is that, for this defense to work, emails
have to be signed, otherwise an adversary can deny service by
pretending to be a sender and spuriously exhausting counters.
Integrity. Pretzel does not offer any guarantees about which
function Yao actually computes. For example, for topic extrac-
tion, the client could garble (§3.2) argmin rather than argmax.
In this case, the aforementioned guarantees continue to hold
(no inputs are disclosed, etc.), though of course this misbehav-
ior interferes with the ultimate functionality. Pretzel does not
defend against this case, and in fact, it could be considered a
feature—it gives the client a passive way to “opt out”, with
plausible deniability (the client could garble a function that
produces an arbitrary choice of index).
The analogous attack, for spam, is for the provider to garble
a function other than threshold comparison. This would under-
mine the spam/nospam classification and would presumably
be disincentivized by the same forces incentivizing providers
to supply spam filtering as a service in the first place.
5 Other details and implementation
Keyword search in Pretzel. So far Pretzel’s design has fo-
cused on modules for classification, but for completeness,
Pretzel also needs to handle a third function: keyword search.
Pretzel’s variant of keyword search is a simple existence proof
that the provider’s servers are not essential: the client simply
maintains and queries a client-side search index. This brings
a storage cost, but our evaluation suggests that it is tolera-
ble (§6.3). One issue is that an index may not be available
if a user logs in from a new machine. This can be addressed
with a provider-side solution, which is future work (such a
solution could be built on searchable symmetric encryption,
which allows search over encrypted data [34, 35, 72, 97]).
Implementation details. We have fully implemented the de-
sign described in §2.2, §3.3, §4, and the keyword search mod-
ule just described. We borrow code from existing libraries:
Obliv-C [132] for Yao’s 2PC protocol;4 XPIR [20] for the
XPIR-BV AHE scheme, LIBLINEAR [24, 51] to train LR and
SVM classifiers, and SQLite FTS4 [9] for the search index.
Besides the libraries, Pretzel is written in 5,300 lines of C++
and 160 lines of Python.
6 Evaluation
Our evaluation answers the following questions:
1. What are the provider- and client-side overheads of Pret-
zel? For what configurations (model size, email size,
etc.) are they low?
2. How much do Pretzel’s optimizations help in reducing
the overheads?
4Another choice would have been TinyGarble [108]. We found the perfor-
mance of Obliv-C and TinyGarble to be comparable for the functions we
compute inside Yao in Pretzel; we choose the former because it is easier to
integrate with Pretzel’s C++ code.
3. How accurate are Pretzel’s functions (for example, how
accurately can Pretzel filter spam emails or extract topics
of emails)?
A summary of evaluation results is as follows:
• Pretzel’s provider-side CPU consumption for spam filtering
and topic extraction is, respectively, 0.65 and 1.03–1.78×
of a non-private arrangement, and, respectively, 0.17× and
0.01–0.02× of its baseline (§3.3).
• Network transfers in Pretzel are 2.7–5.4× of a non-private
arrangement, and 0.024–0.048× of its baseline (§3.3).
• Pretzel’s client-side CPU consumption is less than 1s per
email, and storage space use is a few hundred MBs. These
are a few factors lower than in the baseline (§3.3).
• For topic extraction, the potential coarsening effects of
Pretzel’s classifiers (§4.3) are a drop in accuracy of between
1–3%.
Method and setup. We consider spam filtering, topic extrac-
tion, and keyword search separately.
For spam filtering and topic extraction, we compare Pretzel
to its starting baseline (§3.3) (which we call Baseline), and
NoPriv, which models the status quo, in which the provider
locally runs classification on plaintext email contents. For the
keyword search function, we consider only the basic client-
side search index based scheme (§5).
We vary the following parameters: number of features (N)
and categories (B) in the classification models, number of
features in an email (L), and the number of candidate topics
(B′) in topic extraction. For the classification models, we use
both synthetic and real-world datasets. To generate synthetic
emails, we use random words (between 4 to 12 letters each).
For real-world data, we use the Ling-spam [22] (481 spam
and 2,411 non-spam emails), Enron [10] (17,148 spam and
16,555 non-spam emails of about 150 Enron employees) and
Gmail (355 spam and 600 non-spam emails from the Gmail
account of one of the authors)5 datasets for spam filtering
evaluation, and the 20 Newsgroup [11] (18,846 Usenet posts
on 20 topics), Reuters-21578 [12] (12,603 newswire stories
on 90 topics), and RCV1 [81] (806,778 newswire stories from
296 regions) datasets for topic extraction evaluation.
We measure resource overheads in terms of provider- and
client-side CPU times to process an email, network transfers
between provider and client, and the storage space used at a
client. The resource overheads are independent of the classifi-
cation algorithm (NB, LR, SVM), so we present them once;
the accuracies depend on the classification algorithm, so we
present them for each algorithm.
Our testbed is Amazon EC2. We use one machine of type
m3.2xlarge for the provider and one machine of the same type
for a client. At the provider, we use an independent CPU for
each module/function. Similarly, the client uses a single CPU.
5Gmail stores spam for only a limited time; therefore, we do not have access
to a large number of spam emails. The non-spam emails are from the same
time period as the spam emails.
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encryption decryption addition left shift and add
GPG 1.7 ms 1.3 ms N/A N/A
Paillier 2.5 ms 0.7 ms 7 µs N/A
XPIR-BV 103 µs 31 µs 3 µs 70 µs
Yao cost CPU network transfers
φ = integer comparison 71 µs 2501 B
φ = argmax 70 µs 3959 B
map lookup float addition
NoPriv operations 0.17 µs 0.001 µs
Figure 6—Microbenchmarks for the common operations (Figure 3)
in Pretzel and the baselines. CPU costs come from a single CPU of an
Amazon EC2 machine of type m3.2xlarge. Both CPU and network
costs are averaged over 1,000 runs; standard deviations (not shown)
are within 5% of the averages. GPG encryption/decryption times
depend on the length of the email; we use an email size of 75 KB,
which is in line with average email size [13]. Similarly, Yao costs
for φ=argmax depend linearly on the number of input values; we
show costs per input value.
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Figure 7—Provider-side CPU time per email in microseconds for
the spam filtering module while varying the number of features (N)
in the spam classification model, and the number of features (L)
in an email. CPU time for NoPriv varies only slightly with N (not
visible), while (provider-side) CPU times for Baseline and Pretzel
are independent of both L and N (Figure 3).
Microbenchmarks. Figure 6 shows the CPU and network
costs for the common operations (Figure 3) in Pretzel and the
baselines. We will use these microbenchmarks to explain the
performance evaluation in the next subsections.
6.1 Spam filtering
This subsection reports the resource overheads (provider- and
client-side CPU time, network transfers, and client-side stor-
age space use) and accuracy of spam filtering in Pretzel.
We set three different values for the number of features in
the spam classification model: N={200K, 1M, 5M}. These
values correspond to the typical number of features in vari-
ous deployments of Bayesian spam filtering software [14–
16]. We also vary the number of features in an email
(L={200, 1000, 5000}); these values are chosen based on
the Ling-spam dataset (average of 377 and a maximum of
3638 features per email) and the Gmail dataset (average of
692 and a maximum of 5215 features per email). The number
of categories B is two: spam and non-spam.
Provider-side CPU time. Figure 7 shows the per-email CPU
time consumed by the provider.
Size
N=200K N=1M N=5M
Non-encrypted 4.3 MB 21.5 MB 107.3 MB
Baseline 51.6 MB 258.0 MB 1.3 GB
Pretzel-NoOptimPack 3.1 GB 15.3 GB 76.3 GB
Pretzel 7.4 MB 36.7 MB 183.5 MB
Figure 8—Size of encrypted and plaintext spam classification mod-
els. N is the number of features in the model. Pretzel-NoOptimPack
is Pretzel with the legacy packing technique (§4.2).
For emails with fewer features (L=200), the CPU time of
Pretzel is 2.7× NoPriv’s and 0.17× Baseline’s. Pretzel’s is
more than NoPriv’s because in NoPriv the provider does L
feature extractions, map lookups, and float additions, which
are fast operations (Figure 6), whereas in Pretzel, the provider
does relatively expensive operations: one additively homomor-
phic decryption of a XPIR-BV ciphertext plus one comparison
inside Yao (Figure 3 and §4.1). Pretzel’s CPU time is lower
than Baseline’s because in Pretzel, the provider decrypts a
XPIR-BV ciphertext whereas in Baseline the provider decrypts
a Paillier ciphertext (Figure 6).
As the number of features in an email increases
(L={1000, 5000}), the provider’s CPU time in both Pretzel
and Baseline does not change, as it is independent of L (un-
like the client’s) while NoPriv’s increases since it is linear in
L (see Figure 3). A particular point of interest is L=692 (the
average number of features per email in the Gmail dataset),
for which CPU time of Pretzel is 0.65× NoPriv’s.
Client-side overheads. Figure 8 shows the size of the spam
model for the various systems. We notice that the model
in Pretzel is approximately 7× smaller than the model in
Baseline. This is due to Pretzel’s “across row” packing tech-
nique (§4.2). We also notice that, given its other refine-
ments, Pretzel’s packing technique is essential (the Pretzel-
NoOptimPack row in the figure).
In terms of client-side CPU time, Pretzel takes ≈ 358 ms to
process an email with many features (L=5000) against a large
model (N=5M). This time is dominated by the L left shift and
add operations in the secure dot product computation (§4.2).
Our microbenchmarks (Figure 6) explain this number: 5000
of the left shift and add operation takes 5000× 70µs=350ms.
A large L is an unfavorable scenario for Pretzel: client-side
processing is proportional to L (Figure 3).
Network transfers. Both Pretzel and Baseline add network
overhead relative to NoPriv. It is, respectively, 19.6 KB and
3.6 KB per email (or 26.1% and 4.8% of NoPriv, when consid-
ering average email size as reported by [13]). These overheads
are due to transfer of a ciphertext, and a comparison inside
Yao’s framework (Figure 2). Pretzel’s overheads are higher
than Baseline’s because the XPIR-BV ciphertext in Pretzel is
much larger than the Paillier ciphertext.
Accuracy. Figure 9 shows Pretzel’s spam classification ac-
curacy for the different classification algorithms it supports.
(The figure also shows precision and recall. Higher precision
means lower false positives, or non-spam falsely classified
as spam; higher recall means lower false negatives, or spam
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Ling-spam Enron Gmail
Acc. Prec. Rec. Acc. Prec. Rec. Acc. Prec. Rec.
GR-NB 99.4 98.1 98.1 98.8 99.2 98.4 98.1 99.7 95.2
LR 99.4 99.4 97.1 98.9 98.4 99.5 98.5 98.9 97.2
SVM 99.4 99.2 97.5 98.7 98.5 99.0 98.5 98.9 97.2
GR 99.3 98.1 97.9 98.8 99.2 98.4 98.1 99.7 95.2
Figure 9—Accuracy (Acc.), precision (Prec.), and recall (Rec.) for
spam filtering in Pretzel. Sets of columns correspond to the different
spam datasets, and the rows correspond to the classification algo-
rithms Pretzel supports: GR-NB, binary LR, and two-class SVM
(§3.1). Also shown is accuracy for Grahams-Robinson’s original
Naive Bayes algorithm (GR).
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Figure 10—Provider CPU time per email in milliseconds for topic
extraction, varying the number of categories (B) in the model and the
number of candidate topics (B′). The case B = B′ measures Pretzel
without the decomposed classification technique (§4.3). The y-axis
is log-scaled. N and L are set to 100K and 692 (average number of
features per email in the authors’ Gmail dataset). The CPU times do
not depend on N or L for Pretzel and Baseline; they increase linearly
with L and vary slightly with N for NoPriv.
falsely classified as non-spam.)
6.2 Topic extraction
This subsection reports the resource overheads (provider- and
client-side CPU time, network transfers, and client-side stor-
age space use) and accuracy of topic extraction in Pretzel.
We experiment with N={20K, 100K})6 and B =
{128, 512, 2048}. These parameters are based on the total
number of features in the topic extraction datasets we use
and Google’s public list of topics (2208 topics [8]). For the
number of candidate topics for Pretzel (§4.3), we experiment
with B′={5, 10, 20, 40}.
Provider-side CPU time Figure 10 shows the per email CPU
time consumed by the provider.
Without decomposed classification (§4.3)—this is the
B′ = B case in the figure—Pretzel’s CPU time is signifi-
cantly higher than NoPriv’s but lower than Baseline’s. The
difference between Pretzel and Baseline reflects two facts.
First, XPIR-BV ciphertexts are cheaper to decrypt than Pail-
lier ciphertexts. Second, there are fewer XPIR-BV ciphertexts,
because each is larger, and can thus pack in more plaintext
elements (§4.2).
6The number of features in topic extraction models are usually much lower
than spam models because of many different word variations for spam, e.g.,
FREE and FR33, etc.
network transfers
B=128 B=512 B=2048
Baseline 501.5 KB 2.0 MB 8.0 MB
Pretzel (B′=B) 516.6 KB 2.0 MB 8.0 MB
Pretzel (B′=20) 402.0 KB 402.0 KB 401.9 KB
Pretzel (B′=10) 201.0 KB 201.0 KB 201.2 KB
Figure 11—Network transfers per email for the topic extraction mod-
ule in Pretzel and Baseline. B′ is the number of candidate topics in
decomposed classification (§4.3). Network transfers are independent
of the number of features in the model (N) and email (L) (Figure 3).
Size
N=20K N=100K
Non-encrypted 144.3 MB 769.4 MB
Baseline 288.4 MB 1.5 GB
Pretzel 720.7 MB 3.8 GB
Figure 12—Size of topic extraction models for the various systems.
N is the number of features in the model. B is set to 2048.
With decomposed classification, the number of compar-
isons inside Yao’s framework come down and, as expected,
the difference between CPU times in Pretzel and NoPriv
drops (§4.3). For B=2048, B′=20, Pretzel’s CPU time is
1.78× NoPriv’s; for B=2048, B′=10, it is 1.03× NoPriv’s.
Network transfers. Figure 11 shows the network trans-
fers per email for Baseline and Pretzel. As expected, with
decomposed classification, Pretzel’s network transfers are
lower; they are 402 KB per email, or 5.4× the average
email size of 74KB, as reported in [13] for B=2048, B′=20,
and 201 KB per email (or 2.7× the average email size) for
B=2048, B′=10.
Client-side overheads. Fig. 12 shows the model sizes (be-
fore feature selection §4.3) for the various systems for dif-
ferent values of N and B=2048. Pretzel’s model is bigger
than Baseline’s for two reasons. First, its model comprises an
encrypted part that comes from the provider and a public part.
Second, the XPIR-BV ciphertexts used in the encrypted part
have a larger expansion factor (by a factor of 2) than Paillier
ciphertexts.
In terms of client-side CPU time, as in spam filtering, Pret-
zel (with or without pruning) takes less than half a second to
process an email with many features (L=5000).
Loss of accuracy. Recall that classification accuracy for
topic extraction in Pretzel could be affected by feature selec-
tion and decomposed classification (§4.3). Figure 13 shows
classification accuracy for topic extraction classifiers trained
with and without feature selection, and while varying the
degree of feature selection (using the Chi-square selection
technique [111]). It appears that even after a high degree of
feature selection, accuracy drops only modestly below its
peak point. (This would reduce the client-side storage cost
presented in Figure 12.)
Figure 14 shows the variation in classification accuracy
due to decomposed classification (§4.3). (The depicted data
are for the RCV1 dataset and NB classifier; the qualitative
results are similar for the other datasets and classifiers.) The
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Figure 13—Classification accuracy of topic extraction classifiers
in Pretzel as a function of the degree of feature selection N′/N
(§4.3). (N is the total number of features in the training part of the
datasets and N′ are the number of selected features.) (The 20News
and Reuters datasets come pre-split into training and testing parts:
60%/40% and 75%/25% for the two respectively; we randomly split
RCV1 into 70%/30% training/testing portions.) Pretzel can operate
at a point where number of features selected N′ are roughly 25% of
N; this would result in only a marginal drop in accuracy.
Percentage of the total training dataset
1% 2% 5% 10%
B′=5 79.6 84.0 90.1 94.0
B′=10 89.6 92.1 95.6 97.7
B′=20 95.9 97.3 98.5 99.3
B′=40 98.7 99.3 99.8 99.9
Figure 14—Impact of decomposed classification (§4.3) on classifi-
cation accuracy for the RCV1 dataset with 296 topics. The columns
(except the first) correspond to the percentage of the total training
dataset used to train the (public) model that extracts candidate topics.
The rows correspond to the number of candidate topics (B′). The
cells contain the percentage of test documents for which the “true
category” (according to a classifier trained on the entire training
dataset) is contained in the candidate topics. Higher percentage is
better; 100% is ideal.
data suggest that an effective non-proprietary classifier can
be trained using a small fraction of training data, for only a
small loss in end-to-end accuracy.
6.3 Keyword search and absolute costs
Figure 15 shows the client-side storage and CPU costs of
Pretzel’s keyword search module (§5).
We now consider the preceding costs in absolute terms,
with a view toward whether they would be acceptable in a
deployment. We consider an average user who receives 150
emails daily [119] of average size (75KB) [13], and owns a
mobile device with 32 GB of storage.
To spam filter a long email, the client takes 358 ms, which
would be less than a minute daily. As for the encrypted model,
one with 5M features occupies 183.5 MB or 0.5% of the
device’s storage. For network overheads, each email transfers
an extra 19.33 KB, which is 2.8 MB daily.
For topic extraction, the client uses less than half a second
of CPU per email (or less than 75s daily); a model with 2048
categories (close to Google’s) and 20K features occupies
index size query time update time
Ling-spam 5.2 MB 0.32 ms 0.18 ms
Enron 27.2 MB 0.49 ms 0.1 ms
20 Newsgroup 23.9 MB 0.3 ms 0.12 ms
Reuters-21578 6.0 MB 0.28 ms 0.06 ms
Gmail Inbox (40K emails) 50.4 MB 0.13 ms 0.12 ms
Figure 15—Client-side search index sizes, CPU times to query a
keyword in the indexes (i.e., retrieve a list of emails that contain a
keyword), and CPU times to index a new email.
720.7MB or 2.2% of the device’s storage (this can be reduced
further using feature selection); and, a B′=20 pruning scheme
transfers an extra 59 MB (5.4 times the size of the emails)
over the network daily.
Overall, these costs are certainly substantial—and we don’t
mean to diminish that issue—but we believe that the magni-
tudes in question are still within tolerance for most users.
7 Discussion, limitations, and future work
Pretzel is an improvement over its baseline (§3.3) of up to
100×, depending on the resource (§6). Its absolute overheads
are substantial but, as just discussed (§6.3), are within the
realm of plausibility.
Pretzel’s prototype has many limitations. It does not handle
services beyond what we presented; extending Pretzel to other
functions (predictive personal assistance, virus scanning, etc.)
is future work. So is extending Pretzel to hide metadata, per-
haps by composing with anonymity systems and other secure
computation primitives.
A fundamental limitation of Pretzel is information leak-
age (§2.1, §4.4). As discussed in Section 4.4, the principal
concerns surround the privacy of providers’ models (for spam)
and clients’ emails (during topic extraction). While we don’t
have technical defenses, we note that participation in topic
extraction is voluntary for the client; in fact, a client can opt
out with plausible deniability (§4.4). Moreover, providers
cannot expose all or even a substantial fraction of clients this
way, as that would forfeit the original purpose of topic extrac-
tion. Nevertheless, we are aware that, defaults being defaults,
most clients would not opt out, which means that particular
clients could indeed be targeted by a sufficiently motivated
adversarial provider.
If Pretzel were widely deployed, we would need a way to
derive and retrain models. This is a separate problem, with
existing research [53, 54, 76, 110, 115, 116, 118, 127, 129–
131, 136–138]; an avenue of future work for Pretzel would
be to incorporate these works.
There are many other obstacles between the status quo and
default end-to-end encryption. In general, it’s hard to modify
a communication medium as entrenched as email [52]. On the
other hand, there is reason for hope: TLS between data centers
was deployed over just several years [50]. Another obstacle
is key management and usability: how do users share keys
across devices and find each other’s keys? This too is difficult,
but there is recent research and commercial attention [2, 90,
120]. Finally, politics: there are entrenched interests who
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would prefer email not to be encrypted.
Ultimately, our goal is just to demonstrate an alterna-
tive. We don’t claim that Pretzel is an optimal point in the
three-way tradeoff among functionality, performance, and pri-
vacy (§2.1); we don’t yet know what such an optimum would
be. We simply claim that it is different from the status quo
(which combines rich functionality, superb performance, but
no encryption by default) and that it is potentially plausible.
A Some details of Naive Bayes
A.1 Spam classification
Section 3.1 stated that the GR-NB algorithm labels a docu-
ment (email) as spam if α =1/p(spam |~x)− 1 is greater than
some fixed threshold, and that logα can be expressed as(
i=N∑
i=1
xi · log p(ti |C2)
)
+ 1 · log p(C2)
−
(
i=N∑
i=1
xi · log p(ti |C1)
)
+ 1 · log p(C1), (3)
where the spam category is represented by C1 and non-spam
is C2. Here we show this derivation.
From Bayes Rule:
p(C1 |~x) = p(~x |C1) · p(C1)p(~x) .
Rewriting:
1
p(C1 |~x) − 1 =
p(~x)
p(~x |C1) · p(C1) − 1.
Expanding p(~x) to p(~x |C1) · p(C1) + p(~x |C2) · p(C2):
=
p(~x |C2) · p(C2)
p(~x |C1) · p(C1) . (4)
The Naive Bayes assumption says that the presence (or ab-
sence) of a feature is independent of the other features, which
means
p(~x |Cj) =
i=N∏
i=1
p(ti |Cj)xi .
Plugging the above equation into equation (4):
α =
∏i=N
i=1 p(ti |C2)xi · p(C2)∏i=N
i=1 p(ti |C1)xi · p(C1)
.
In log space, the expression above is equation (3).
A.2 Multinomial text classification
Section 3.1 stated that the multinomial NB algorithm identi-
fies the category Cj∗ that maximizes j∗ = argmaxj p(Cj |~x).
The section stated that the maximal p(Cj |~x) can be deter-
mined by examining(
i=N∑
i=1
xi · log p(ti |Cj)
)
+ 1 · log p(Cj),
for each j. Here we give a derivation of this fact.
From Bayes Rule:
p(Cj |~x) = p(~x |Cj) · p(Cj)p(~x) . (5)
The multinomial Naive Bayes algorithm assumes that a doc-
ument, email, or feature vector~x is formed by picking, with
replacement, L=
∑i=N
i=1 xi features from the set of N features
in the model. Then, p(~x |Cj) is modeled as a multinomial
distribution:
p(~x |Cj) = p(L) · L!∏i=N
i=1 xi!
·
i=N∏
i=1
p(ti |Cj)xi .
Plugging the above equation into Equation (5):
=
1
p(~x)
· p(L) · L!∏i=N
i=1 xi!
·
i=N∏
i=1
p(ti |Cj)xi · p(Cj)
Discounting the terms that are independent of j (which we are
free to do because the maximum is unaffected by such terms),
the expression above becomes:
i=N∏
i=1
p(ti |Cj)xi · p(Cj),
which, when converted to log space, is the claimed expression.
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